DIGITALNA ARHIVA ŠUMARSKOG LISTA
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| ŠUMARSKI LIST 5-6/1985 str. 16 <-- 16 --> PDF |
15. »ZAKON O ŠUMAMA« Narodne novine broj 54/1983. 16. »ZAKON O AMORTIZACIJI DRUŠTVENIH SREDSTAVA«, Službeni list SFRJ broj 70/1984, str. 1550—1584. 17. Pančić , V., Suhina , B.: »Primjena Zakona o amortizaciji društvenih sredstava s godišnjim predračunom amortizacije«, Računovodstvo i financije 3, 1985, Zagreb, str. 10—29. Some Financial Consequences of the New Organization of Forestry in the Socialist Republic of Croatia Summary The New Forestry Act of the Socialist Republic of Croatia has introduced in this Republic the so-called functional organization of the main forestry activities.´ Special basic organizations of associated labour (BOALs) for the biological reproduction of forests (silviculture and forest protection) aid special BOALs for forest exploitation have been established. In this work the author considers the question of prices at which BOALs for biological reproduction should sell standing timber under such conditions, to whom will possible extra incomes (rents) deriving from exceptionally favourable business conditions accrue, who will invest in forest communications necessary profitable forest exploitation, and to whom wi] the newly-built forest communications belong. The author gives to these guestions the followiig answers: 1) The best solution is for BOALs for biological forest reproduction to sell their standing timber according to planned (normal or objective) forest taxes (calculated deductively, proceeding from the market prices of forest exploitation products). In this case all »forest rents (extra incomes) together« will be left for biological forest reproduction. These BOALs will invest necessary resources in the construction of new permanent forest communications, they will maintain and use them until the new exploitation of the forests involved, and they will »own« them. 2) BOALs for the biological reproduction of forests could sell their standing timber at so-caled inductive prices of standing timber based on »false social values«. In such a case rents (extra incomes), both absolute and those stemming from fertility I and II, would be left for the biological reproduction of forests, while rents (extra incomes) stemming from locations I and II and all rents (extra incomes) stemmieg from monopoli tistic positions would be lest for forest exploitation. These BOALs would invest funds in the construction of new permanent forest communications necessary for forest exploitation. After the completion :>f the exploitation of the forests, BOALs for forest exploitation would leave them for further maintenance and utilization to the BOALs for biological reproduction and even transfer them into their »ownership« (against an appropriate compensation or free of charge). However, in this way the BOALs for forest exploitation would unjustibiably obtain rents (extra incomes) stemming from locations I, could stray by forcing momentarily more profitable forms of »opening forests«, and the above-mentioned inductive prices cannot, anyhow, be reliably determined (because it is not known to what part of the worst forests they should apply). 3) In he event of the pooling of labour and resources of forestry in forestry- woodworking-trading complexes it is first necessary from joint income to set aside extra incomes (rents) and to assign them to the participants in association, whereafter the remaining, rent-unrelated part of joint income would be distributed among all participants proportionately to their »self-lanaging internal prices of exchange« (for more details se 11). This income distribution should be governed by economic laws, restructing within production complexes should be carried out on the basis of specific-purpose pooling of funds, while resport to »social measure« should only by made by consensus for a very short period of time in order to achieve financial balance among all participants in association in production complexes (for more information see 12). |